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allowing the Souvalls to attempt to sell the corporate assets for
$200,000 and thus salvage their homes from foreclosure. (R.
253-4, 437). After proper disclaimer by the Bankruptcy
Court (R. 256, Exhibit 2-P), many assets were sold to third
parties, and the money was applied towards payment of the
outstanding indebtedness. (R. 253-7). In all instances the
Souvalls found buyers and negotiated the sales price, and the
lenders approved and received the proceeds.
During the above course of events, the Universal Leasing
Company was merged with Rockwell Exploration Company,
giving birth to a new company known as Universal Rockwell.
Under the terms of the merger, it was possible to exchange
10,000 shares of Universal Leasing Company stock for 4,530,000 shares of stock in the new corporation. (R. 259-261, 291).
On February 16, 1970, North Star Marine Sales Company was
merged into the new company. (Exhibit 27-P). Defendant
S. Craig Hunter learned about this new proposed merger early
in February, 1970. He attended the meeting of the merging
corporation representatives (Mark Eames of Rockwell and
Jerry Timothy of North Star Marine Sales) on February 12,
1970. (R. 604, 730). They were interested in getting Hunter
involved because he had a securities dealer's license, and they
wanted some brokerage support, somebody to make a market
in the stock and tell brokers about it. (R 606). Mark Eames,
President of Universal Rockwell, told him about the 10,000
shares of Universal Leasing stock that had been pledged to the
Bank by the Souvalls, and indicated to him that these might
be available for purchase. (R. 426, 607). Mark Eames gave
Hunter two financial statements of Universal Leasing, one
dated March 31, 1969 and one dated November, 1969 (Ex.
230, R. 607).
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Hunter first approached the Bank and later the Souvalls
and inquired about purchasing the stock. (R. 257). Souvalls
sent him to the Bank for information. Donald M. Bennett, an
officer at the Bank, showed Mr. Hunter two Universal Leasing
Company financial statements, both dated August 31, 1969.
(R. 343, Exhibits 13-P and 14-P). At that time Mr. Bennett
explained to Hunter that the two statements, although both
daed August 31, 1969, showed different total amounts and
were somewhat inconsistent; that he didn't know which one
was right. (R. 373-4, 403). He urged Mr. Hunter to determine the value of the stock for himself. (R. 375). Hunter was
also cautioned to audit the company himself or otherwise obtain additional financial information about the leasing company. Hunter did not tell the Bank officers of his prior meetings with Eames and Timothy. (R. 375, 848). The financial
statements came into Don Bennett's possession not from the
Souvalls but from the Spanish Fork branch of the Bank, where
Universal Leasing had some loans. (R. 355, 399). The Souvalls did not know that Bennett had the financial statements
of Universal Leasing. Hunter never asked the Souvalls for
any information concerning the value of Universal Rockwell
stock. (R. 425). John Langeland, Senior Vice President of
the Bank urged Hunter on a later occasion to check the books
to make sure the financial statements were correct. (R. 853-4).
All of Hunter's questions were answered about the stock. (R.
405).
When Hunter first came into the Bank to inquire about
purchasing the stock, he was asked by Bank representatives
where he was going to get the money to buy the stock. He
answered that he had enough New York securities to take care
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of it. (R. 320, 343, 344, 348 and 465). He also explained
that he was trying to gtt control of the leasing company. (R.
274).
Since the stock in question was an investment-type stock,
and could be sold only on a restricted basis, Mr. Hunter went
to great lengths to have the restrictions removed and have the
security changed to a free-trading stock. This was done through
Attorney Alex Walker of Salt Lake City, Utah, who prepared
an opinion stating that a change of circumstances regarding
the Souvall investment had occurred and that they should now
be free to" sell the stock on an unrestricted basis. (R. 236-5,
339, 348, 412, Exhibit 32-P). Particular attention should be
given to Exhibit 32-P.
On March 9, 1970, the plaintiff corporations and guarantors entered into a Contract of Sale with defendant S. Craig
Hunter (Exhibit 3-P), wherein Hunter agreed to pay the sum
of $133,500.00, payable by cashier's check or bank draft, for
the 10,000 shares of stock and certain other assets included
in the sale. The contract recited that Universal Rockwell had
consented to the elimination of the restrictions upon the stock
(Exh. 3-P, R. 285). On the closing date, Hunter was unable
to make immediate payment as agreed therein. (R. 612). He
explained to the sellers that he had to liquidate his New York
securities to get the money. (R. 344, 277).
On March 25, 1970, Hunter went to the Bank and requested that the stock be delivered to him prior to payment,
stating that the funds were being made available and that he
would soon be able to pay the full amount of the contract.
(R. 342-4). After some deliberation, the Bank released the
5
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stock to him without payment on his assurance that the money
would soon be forthcoming. A few days later, he signed a
Promissory Note in the sum of $133,500.00, evidencing his
indebtedness under the contract. (R. 345, Exhibit 11-P).
Throughout this period, the principals in the merging
corporations were extolling the great advantages of the proposed and completed mergers of the companies involved therein. (Exhibit 27-P). Hunter had met with the officers of the
companies and was informed of the developments in this regard (R. 604-6). On February 27, 1970, Mr. Mark Eames,
President of Universal Leasing, told Donald M. Bennett that
the stock of the new corporation was worth five cents a share
and that the 10,000 shares of leasing company stock could be
exchanged for 4,500,000 shares in the new corporation. (Exhibit 16-P). Hunter planned to make a market in the new
corporation's stock prior to contacting the Souvalls or the
Bank. (R. 730). He commenced selling it for ten cents a
share. (R. 802).
The same day that Hunter received the stock, he in fact
exchanged it for 4,530,000 shares of stock in Universal Rockwell, which he then sold, pledged or traded for other various
items of value. (R. 782-796). Subsequent thereto, Hunter
and his attorney repeatedly assured the Bank and the Souvalls
that Hunter would make full payment under the contract. On
one occasion he paid $9,000.00 on the total obligation, but
he never made any other payments on the contract. Some payments were made by the Souvalls when they later sold assets
conveyed under the agreement to Hunter, but over $80,000.00
remained due and owing at the time of suit. Defendant never
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returned any of the stock or stock of comparable value to the
Bank. He brought in some restricted lettered stock which was
not free trading stock, in the name of a third party. (R. 369).
On June 15, 1970, suit was filed to recover for the unpaid balance under the contract and under the Promissory
Note. In his Answer to the Complaint, Hunter claimed for the
first time that he had been misled by the plaintiffs and the
Bank. (R. 276). He filed a Counterclaim asking for damages
for fraud under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 61-122(1) (b) against the plaintiff corporations and the Souvalls
(Tr. 56), and common law fraud against the Bank. (Tr. 36).
At the trial, Hunter claimed that his failure to pay was
bottomed on his later knowledge that the Universal Leasing
Company was not in good financial condition and that the
stock was worthless. He claimed that plaintiffs had failed to
inform him of this fact during their negotiations. However,
the evidence reveals that as late as September 1970, the defendant was trying to sell the stock to other people. (R. 796). In
reality it appears that Hunter found out that his stock was of
little value when he learned of the recision of the merger of
Universal Rockwell and North Star Marine Sales, Inc. on May
27, 1970. (Ex. 29-P).
Hunter admitted that he had no New York stock or other
securities; (R. 466) that he owned no New York securities
when he went to the Bank to purchase the Universal Leasing
Company stock. (R. 711).
As above noted, in the Answer and Counterclaims, Hunter
alleged common law fraud against the Bank and statutory
fraud under Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section
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61-1-22(1) (b) against the Souvalls and the corporations. At
the conclusion of the trial, he attempted to change the basis of
his defense against the Bank to include statutory fraud. The
Court denied his motion, and the matter was submitted to the
jury on fact interrogatories (R. 186). The jury totally rejected defendant's fraud theories and sustained the positions of
the plaintiffs and the Bank on all factual issues. Defendant
has filed timely appeal from the Court's Judgment.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK WAS NOT
THE AGENT OF THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATIONS OR GUARANTORS IN THE SALE
OF UNIVERSAL LEASING COMPANY STOCK.
In his brief on appeal, defendant argues that the Zions
First National Bank, intervening plaintiff in this action, became the agent of the plaintiffs for the sale of a security under
Utah Code Annotated, Section 61-1-22(1) (b) (1953) because it required express consent of the stock owner before releasing any information about the stock in question. The evidence quoted in support of this novel theory shows only that
the Bank refused to convey any information until it was properly authorized by its customer to do so. No other testimony
in the record supports defendant's claim of an agency relationship between the Bank and the plaintiffs.
In Hunter's Counterclaim he specifically alleges that the
officers of the Bank gave a financial statement to him when
they knew that the stock described in the Complaint was worthless, and when they knew that the Universal Leasing Company
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was in poor financial condition, and when they knew that
the financial statements which they gave to the defendant were
inaccurate, misleading and false. The jury found as a fact that
none of these allegations were true (Tr. 186). The Counterclaim against the Souvalls is different in that it alleges that
the Souvalls as sellers of the stock did so in violation of U.C.A.,
6l-l-22-(l) ( b ) . The difference is significant. In one case,
we are dealing with common law fraud (a deliberate misrepresentation) and in the other we are dealing with a statutory
violation (omission to state a fact necessary. . . ) .
At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant made
his first attempt to bring the Bank under the provisions of the
statute by submitting proposed instructions on the question
of statutory fraud against the Bank under the agency theory (R.
136, 140, 147). The Court properly rejected this attempt
to change the basic issues of the trial and refused to instruct the
jury on the agency question. Only the defense of common law
fraud against the Bank had been raised during the pleading
stages of the case. The trial was conducted by Court and counsel in accordance with those pleadings. Attorneys for the Bank,
had until that time, no reason to attempt to meet the defense of statutory fraud under agency principles, and the proposed change would have placed them in a very unfavorable
and unfair position when the matter was submitted to the jury.
The Court properly rejected the defendant's belated attempt
to assert a statutory defense against the Bank.
Even if an earlier assertion of agency fraud had been
made in the case, the Trial Court would have had no reason to
instruct on the question of agency because the evidence would
not support such an instruction. The testimony quoted by de-
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fendant Hunter in his brief, even viewed in a light most favorable to him, does not sustain his position. It reveals only that
the Bank officials insisted that Hunter obtain the consent of
its customers before releasing information about their property that was found in its files. The background evidence in
the case is necessary to fully understand the position of the
Bank and to place the testimony quoted in defendant's brief
in its proper perspective.
The true relationship between the plaintiffs and the Bank
was that of debtor and creditor. The Bank and the SBA had
loaned $200,000.00 to the plaintiffs and plaintiffs had defaulted in their repayment. When foreclosure was imminent,
plaintiffs requested the right to dispose of the pledged assets
on a voluntary basis rather than under forced sale (R. 253-4,
437). They were attempting to salvage their homes which
had been pledged as security on the loan. Only the price of
sale of the assets was subject to the approval of the Bank and
the SBA (R. 253-4). Under the loan arrangements, the
10,000 shares of Universal Leasing Company stock had been
delivered to the Bank for security purposes. The Bank did not
solicit Hunter to buy the stock and did not represent its value.
The evidence clearly shows that the Souvalls, not the Bank,
were sellers of the stock. When Hunter approached the Souvalls to obtain information about the stock, he was referred
to the Bank, who required him to obtain consent from the
Souvalls before releasing information out of its files. This requirement did not make the Bank an agent for the Souvalls
in selling the stock. Bank officials were merely exercising due
and proper caution required by its own rules to protect the
confidential nature of its dealings with its customers. Good
sense on the part of Banks requires this procedure. If the
10
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officers had indiscriminately passed out information in its
files without the customer's consent, it might have been leaving itself open for lawsuits of another nature. The precautionary measures practiced in this instance did not give rise to a
responsibility of agency as alleged by the defendant on this
appeal.
The Courts have never extended agency principles to
include the circumstances under which the Bank released information to Hunter under the facts of this case. In 2 C.J.S.,
Agency, Section 17, we find that the creation of the relation
of principal and agent rests in the intention of the parties and
must be determined from the facts and circumstances of a
particular case. Without intention on the part of the principal
to appoint and intention on the part of the agent to accept
the appointment, there is no agency. We find from 3 Am.
Jur. 2d, Agency, Section 2, that one of the prime elements of
an agency relationship is the existence of some degree of control by the principal over the conduct and activities of the
agent.
Utah law follows these concepts. In Continental Bank
and Trust Company v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 370, 384 P.2d 796
at 800 (1963), the Supreme Court of Utah pointed out that
an agency relationship is bottomed on the consent of the
parties. The Court's words are as follows:
". . . [A}gency is defined by the American Law
Institute Restatement of Agency 2d, Section 1, as follows:
* Agency is the fiduciary relation which results
from the manifestation of consent by one person to
another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so
to act/ "
11
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There is no indication in our case that the Bank would be subject to the control of the Souvalls or that the Bank could bind
the Souvalls in any way. Evidence of such a binding relationship between the Bank and the plaintiffs is simply nonexistent in the present state of the record.
The Utah Court also held in Wilkerson v. Stevens, 16
Utah 2d 424, 403 P.2d 31 (1965), that proof of existence
of the alleged principal and agent relationship requires showing of a reasonable basis to support a finding that the alleged
agent and the undisclosed principal so intended, and includes
at least some knowledge and intention of participation in the
transaction by the alleged principal. That case also held that
one who claims an agency relationship must necessarily bring
forth the facts to show the existence thereof. Defendant has
utterly failed to do so in this case, so his allegations in regard
to this issue were properly rejected by the Court.
It should also be noted that the statute makes an agent
of the seller jointly and severally liable when he "materially"
aids in the sale. The evidence in this case forecloses any instruction to the jury on this defense because whatever part
the Bank played in the sale was totally immaterial to its execution. Its representatives showed two financial statements to the
defendant and then pointed out to him that they were totally
inconsistent with one another. (R. 373-4, 403). He was repeatedly advised to check the books and make sure that the
financial statements were correct. (R. 643-4). Hunter was
anxious to free the stock for sale and go forward with the
purchase (R. 424). The Bank's activities made no differ-
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ence in the sale. Hunter knew what he wanted to do and
needed no urging to obtain the stock. He was acting on his
own, and if there was folly, it resulted from his own activities.
Although the Court dismissed the Counterclaim alleging
fraud against the Bank and the plaintiffs, the Judge permitted
the jury to consider defendant's fraud claim as an affirmative
defense. The following interrogatories and the jury's response
thereto are shown in the record:
11.

Do you find that the officers and agents of Zions
First National Bank made a representation of a
material fact to the defendant, S. Craig Hunter:
Answer:

No

12.

Do you find that the representation so made was
false.
Answer: No

13.

Do you find that the representation was known
by the Bank's officers or agents to be false when
it was made or that such statement was made
recklessly with knowledge that there was insufficient information upon which to base such
statement?
Answer: No

14.

Do you find that such statement was made with
fraudulent intent for the purpose of inducing
the defendant to act and rely thereon?
Answer:

No

From the above we note that the trier of fact determined
from the evidence that defendant had not sustained the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence on his allegations
of fraud. It is inconceivable that the jury would have changed
13
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its opinion if the Court had reserved the Counterclaims for
later decision. Under any theory, the jury's decision would
have foreclosed a Judgment in defendant's favor.
The only way the Bank could have been charged under
the statute for fraud is in an agency capacity with the plaintiff corporations. The statute cannot be made applicable to
the actions of the Bank unless such an agency relationship is
shown. There is no evidence in the record to affirm and support the assertions of the defendant on this appeal, and the
Trial Court should be sustained in its refusal to include the
Bank under the provisions of Section 61-1-22(1) (b) Utah
Code Annotated 1953.
POINT

II

THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
LOAN APPLICATION (PROPOSED EXHIBIT
7-D) WAS NOT MATERIAL TO THE ISSUES
OF THIS CASE AND WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED BY THE COURT.
During the trial, defendant Hunter asked that the loan
application submitted by the plaintiffs to the Small Business
Administration in 1969 be received in evidence (Exhibit 7-D).
Plaintiffs objected on the grounds that the exhibit was not
relevant or material to the issues of the suit, and the Judge
sustained that objection (R. 298-304). Defendant asserts on
this appeal that the ruling was erroneously prejudicial to his
case.
It should be remembered that the action now before the
Court seeks to recover the unpaid balance on a contract of sale
for 10,000 shares of stock in the Universal Leasing Company
and other assets described in the Contract of Sale (Exhibit
14
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3-P). The Contract was dated March 9, 1970. The Small
Business Administration application (Exhibit 7-D) was prepared in June 1969 (Exhibit 32-P, Page 4 ) . It was part
of the preliminary negotiations between the plaintiffs, the
Bank and the Small Business Administration, which culminated in a participation loan to the plaintiffs in the sum of $200,000.00. Although the course of events that led up to the present action may have begun with the loan, those facts are only
incidental and preliminary to the issues of this case. It is not
contended that the SBA loan was invalid or improper in any
regard. It is admitted by all the parties that the entire amount
of the loan was due and payable before defendant purchased
the stock. The guarantors were attempting to pay off the loan
without losing their homes, and the sale of stock to Hunter
was part of their attempt to liquidate the assets without loss
of their personal property. Of course, the borrowers and the
Bank were working together in some ways to recover the defaulted loan balance, but this concerted effort was no evidence
of fraud or deceit on the purchaser of the stock. It is reasonable
that the Bank would be interested in doing everything legally
possible to collect the amount due on the defunct loan. A
contrary position would be sheer folly on its part.
Except as stated above, the application for the original
loan is totally unrelated to this action. It was prepared almost
a year before the present cause of action ever arose. Any
omissions or misstatements therein could not have been made
to induce the defendant to purchase the leasing company stock
because no such purchase was even anticipated until after the
loan was in default. Even if the exhibit revealed that the borrowers didn't follow the Small Business Administration procedures in obtaining the loan in 1969, such facts would be im15
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material to the issues before the Court. The preparation of the
loan application was far too remote to have any probative value
in this case. Conditions of the respective companies and persons involved in the loan had markedly changed from the
time the loan application was submitted, and it had no value
for purposes of this case.
Appellant argues further that the Exhibit should have
been admitted to show that an officer of the Bank was also an
officer of the borrowing Corporation. There is no dispute on
this point between the parties. It was readily admitted by both
the plaintiffs and the Bank that John Langeland, Senior Vice
President of the Bank and T. Bowering Woodbury, a Vice
President of the Bank, were both stockholders of the borrowing
corporations and served as Directors and members of the
Executive Committees of both corporations (R. 80-84). The
proposed exhibit was not necessary to prove this point to the
jury.
Appellant also asserts that the exhibit was material and
relevant to establish the identity and value of the assets sold to
him under the Contract of Sale. The assets purchased by defendant were clearly described in the Contract of Sale (Exhibit
3-P) and no reference need be made to the loan application
to establish their identity. In fact the loan application might
even cause some confusion in this regard.
It is true that mention was made of the SBA loan application during the testimony of Peter Souvall, but the contents of
that application were not discussed. The only discussion was
directed to the existence and execution of the loan application
itself. The plaintiffs made no attempt to discuss the contents
of the loan application or introduce the exhibit in evidence (R.
16
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245-50). Comments of counsel in their opening statements
are not evidence and do not provide a basis for introduction of
evidence in a lawsuit. For this reason, the estoppel argument
asserted by the appellant in his brief would not apply to this
situation.
The Courts have generally held that the exclusion of evidence as irrelevant or immaterial either because it is too remote, too uncertain or too conjectural, is a matter largely within the discretion of the Trial Court, and a ruling thereon will
not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion clearly
appears. See 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, Section 251. In the
matter now before the Court, there was no abuse of discretion
and Exhibit 7-D was properly excluded from the evidence because it was not probative of any fact in issue. On the contrary, it would have opened a Pandora's Box of inquiry that
would have unnecessarily lengthened the already long and
burdensome matter before the Court.
POINT

III

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE LIABILITY PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES
ACT.
Defendant-appellant contends in Point III of his Argument on appeal that the Trial Court committed prejudicial
error in its instructions numbers 17 and 19 when it failed to
instruct the jury that liability under the Utah Uniform Securities Act can be predicated upon omissions as well as misrepresentations or mere half-truths. This contention is clearly without merit. The record discloses that the Trial Court properly
defined the bases of liability under the Uniform Security Act
17
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in its charge to the jury. The Court's instructions, when considered as a whole and in connection with the evidence received during the trial, indicate that liability under the Utah
Uniform Securities Act may be predicated both upon misrepresentations and certain types of omissions.
Section 61-1-22(1) (b) of the Utah Uniform Securities
Act provides that:
61-1-22(1) Any person who
Jt
W

Jt
TV"

Ji.
TV"

Ji,
TV*

(b) offers or sells a security by means of any
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to
state a material act necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading (the buyer not
knowing of the untruth or omission,) and does not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and
in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of the untruth or omission, is liable to the person buying the security from him . . . . [Emphasis
supplied}
It is clear that, as defendant-appellant contends, this
statute renders unlawful any attempt to sell a security by means
of an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to
state a material fact in connection with a sale of a security or
offer to sell same. However, the omission to state a material
fact must be an omission to state a material fact made m connection with certain other statements made, which said material fact is necessary in order to make the other statements not
misleading. Moreover, the omission, to be actionable, must be
misleading in the light of the circumstances under which it
occurred. In other words, the omission must make other statements appear misleading before a violation occurs. This inter18
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pretation of the language of the statute relating to omissions
has been offered in a substantial number of cases construing
identical language of federal law. Hughes v. S.E.C., 174 F.2d
969 (D.C. Cir., 1949; Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.Supp.
808 (D.C. Del., 1951); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th
Cir., 1961); In Re American Trailer Rentals Co., 325 F.2d
47 (10th Cir, 1963), reversed 379 U.S. 594 (1965); Kohler
v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir, 1963); Trussell v. United
Underwriters, 228 F.Supp. 757 (D.C. Colo. 1964); S.E.C. v.
Franklin Atlas Corp., 154 F. Supp. 395 (D.C.S.D. N.Y,
1957); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir, 1967), cert,
denied 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
The record clearly indicates that the Trial Court instructed
the jury that liability under the Uniform Securities Act may
be predicated upon such omissions. In fact, both instructions
numbers 15 and 17 indicate that liability under the Utah Uniform Securities Act may be predicated upon certain types of
omissions, and instruction 17 clearly sets forth the circumstances under which an omission may be regarded as a violation of that Act. Instruction No. 15 (R. 165) reads as follows:
INSTRUCTION

NO.

15

You are instructed that Section 61-1-22 of the
statutes of State of Utah provides that "Any person
who offers or sells a security by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a
material act necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading (the Buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission), and who does not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and
in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of the untruth or omission is liable to the person buying the security from him . . .
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Further, Instruction No. 17 (R. 167) reads:
INSTRUCTION

NO.

17

You are instructed that the defendant claims that
the plaintiffs, S & F Supply Company, The Dinner
Table, Inc., and Andrew W. Souvall and Peter W.
Souvall, individually and as agents and officers of the
corporate plaintiffs, knowingly and willfully and with
intent that defendant rely thereon and be deceived
thereby, induced defendant to purchase the said shares
of stock by failing to represent to defendant certain
material facts necessary in order to make the statements
made by plaintiffs to defendant, in light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading, which
material facts are:
(a) That Universal Rockwell, Ltd. was in very
serious financial difficulty, and
(b) That because of such difficulty, plaintiffs
then expected the stock of said corporation to become
valueless within a short period of time.
Before you can consider whether or not the plaintiffs omitted to state any material fact, you must first
find from a preponderance of the evidence that certain
statements about the particular subject were made by
the plaintiffs to the defendant, and that in the light of
the circumstances under which these statements were
made, it then became the duty and burden of the plaintiffs, as sellers of the securities, to state further facts
and make a full and complete disclosure of all material
facts known to them. Thus, the statute makes it fraudulent to state any untrue statement of a material fact
with intent to deceive or make any statements that
were half-true, as far as they went, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made. (Empahsis
supplied}.
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The above instructions, when considered as a whole and
in connection with the evidence in the instant case, clearly
indicate that liability under the Utah Uniform Securities Act
may be predicated upon certain types of omissions. Moreover,
it is clear that the challenged instructions rigorously defined
for the jury the circumstances in which, under the Utah Uniform Securities Act, liability would attach for such omissions.
This Honorable Court, and the Supreme Court of the
United States as well have repeatedly held that in reviewing the
propriety and correctness of instructions, the Appellate Court
should read the challenged instruction in connection with other
instructions that have been given and consider the adequacy
of the charge as a whole, disregarding errors and omissions
contained in individual instructions. Seaboard Airline R. Co. v.
Padgett, 236 U.S. 668, 35 S.Ct. 481, 59 L.Ed. 777 (1915);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 at 156, 87 S.Ct.
1975, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1094 (1967); Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah
631, 237 P.2d 834 (1951); Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah
312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937); Redd v. Airway Motor Coachlines,
104 Utah 9, 137 P.2d 374 (1943); Brunson v. Strong, 17
Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966); Rims v. Pacific Finance
Co., 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 P.2d 990 (1964).
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, a case in which
certain individual instructions were challenged as erroneous
and prejudicial, Justice Harlan, speaking for the U.S. Supreme
Court, said:
The impact of a jury instruction "is not to be
ascertained by merely considering isolated statements
but by taking into view all the instructions given and
the tendencies of the proof in the case to which they
could possibly be applied.,, Seaboard Air Line R. Co.
v. Padgett, 236 U.S. 668, 672.
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Similarly, in Startin v. Madsen, supra, a case in which
there were numerous assignments of error relating to the giving and to the refusal to give instructions, Justice Crockett,
speaking for this Honorable Court, said:
"It was the duty of the court to cover the theories
of both parties in his instructions. Martineau v. Hanson, 47 Utah 549, 155 P. 432; McDonald v. Union
Pacific R. Co, 109 Utah 493, 167 P.2d 685. If the
instructions are considered as a whole, as they must
be, Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654;
Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, 104 Utah 9,
137 P.2d 374, the court adequately discharged this
duty and fairly presented the issues to the jury." (237
P.2d 834 at 836).
In the instant case, the instructions of the Court, when
taken as a whole and considered in connection with the evidence, clearly counsel that a violation may be predicated upon
certain enumerated types of omissions as well as misstatements
of material facts. Thus, defendant-appellant's claim that the
Trial Court failed to properly instruct the jury on this point is
without merit.
Finally, the argument of the defendant-appellant on this
point is totally based upon an assumed fact that is not supported by the record. Before the statute can apply to the Bank,
it must be shown that the Bank was a seller of stock. As discussed in another part of this brief, the Bank in this instance
was not selling the stock in question. The stock was being
sold by the Souvall brothers at their request and for their benefit. The charge of omissions is made against the non-selling
Bank only. Defendant-appellant does not claim that the Souvalls made any omissions as to any material fact. This charge
is made against the Bank only. As heretofore discussed, the
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Bank was neither the seller of the stock nor the agent of the
Souvalls for purposes of such a sale. For this reason the Court
had no reason to go into a detailed explanation of the statute
as it related to omissions of fact. The statute applied only to
the Souvalls, who had made no such omissions. Therefore, no
instruction on this point was necessary in this case.
POINT

IV

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S
STATUTORY DEFENSE AND CONCERNING
THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
Defendant-appellant contends in Point IV of the Argument portion of his brief that the Trial Court committed
prejudicial error when it improperly instructed the jury concerning defendant's statutory defense and concerning the burden of proof. This contention will not withstand even the most
perfunctory analysis.
A.
Defendant-appellant argues that the Trial Court's failure
to permit the defendant to amend his pleadings to allege a
separate statutory fraud action and defense against the intervening plaintiff Bank, and that the Trial Court's concomitant
failure to instruct the jury concerning defendant-appellant's
alleged defense of statutory fraud under Section 61-1-22(1)
(b) of Utah's Uniform Securities Act, was prejudicial error.
This Honorable Court and the United States Supreme
Court have repeatedly held that instructions are properly given
by the Trial Court only in those instances where an issue upon
which an instruction is sought is properly supported by evi-
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dence. Where there is no basis in evidence for an issue to be
covered by an instruction, it is improper to give said instruction. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co. v. Whitacare, 242 U.S. 169,
37 S.Q. 33, 61 L.Ed. 228 (1916); Bird v. U.S., 187 U.S. 118,
23 S.Ct. 42,47 L.Ed. 100 (1902); Coffin v. United States, 162
U.S. 664, 16 S.Ct. 943, 40 L.Ed. 1109 (1896); Keyser v. Hitz,
133 U.S. 138, 10 S.Ct. 290, 33 L.Ed. 531 (1890); Olsen v.
Warwood, 123 Utah 111, 255 P.2d 725 (1953); Griffin v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co., 102 Utah 563, 133 P.2d 333 (1943);
Jensen v. Utah Railway Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349 (1927).
In Griffin v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, the Supreme
Court of Utah enunciated the general rule in this jurisdiction
governing the giving by the Trial Court of instructions to the
jury:
"It is no doubt error to give instructions on 'a state
of facts which there is no evidence tending to prove,
or which the undisputed evidence in the case shows
did not exist, even should such instructions contain correct statements of law/ Jensen v. Utah Railway Co.,
72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349, 358." (133 P.2d 333 at
336).
Similarly, in Olsen v. Warwood, supra, Justice McDonough, speaking for this Honorable Court, said:
"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an instruction must be based on evidence, and that it is
prejudicial error to submit a charged act . . . to a jury
for its consideration in the absence of evidence tending
to support a finding that the act occurred." (225 P.2d
725 at 727).
In the instant case, it cannot be said that there was evidence tending to support a finding that the intervening plaintiff Bank was guilty of a violation of the Utah Uniform Securi-
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ties Act in failing and omitting to advise defendant-appellant
of certain material information relating to the Universal Leasing stock sought to be purchased by defendant-appellant. In
point of fact, the testimony proffered during trial is quite conclusive that the intervening plaintiff Bank was not cognizant of
any material information relating to the financial condition
of Universal Leasing other than that provided to defendantappellant, and that the officers of the intervening plaintiff
Bank repeatedly advised the defendant-appellant of the need
for him to conduct a full and independent inquiry concerning
the financial condition of Universal Leasing prior to the consummation of purchase of that company's stocks. The testimony in this regard has been discussed in detail in Point I of
this brief, and for reasons of brevity will not be repeated at
this time. It is sufficient to state that the Souvalls were the
sellers of the stock and that the Bank's participation was only
incidental thereto. Any assertions to the contrary are unsupported by the evidence. There was no evidentiary basis for an
instruction by the Trial Court concerning the intervening
plaintiff's alleged omission to provide material information to
defendant-appellant. In point of fact, the testimony proferred
at the trial clearly indicated that the officers of the Bank repeatedly advised defendant to obtain his own information about
the stock. Since the Bank was neither the seller nor the seller's
agent, the Trial Court had no reason to give an instruction concerning the alleged omission of material facts,
B.
Defendant-appellant also argues in this section of his brief
that the jury was prevented from finding that the Souvalls were
liable under the Utah Uniform Securities Act because the
Trial Court's instruction number 17 omitted to indicate to the
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jury that liability under said Act can be predicted upon omissions. This argument is extensively treated under Point III of
this brief.

C
Defendant-appellant further contends in this section of
his brief that certain enumerated instructions given by the Trial
Court erroneously and incorrectly state the burden and elements of proof under the Utah Uniform Securities Act (See
defendant-appellant's brief pp. 22-23), and that certain enumerated interrogatories further misrepresent the nature of the
burden of proof required in the instant case (See defendant-appellant's brief pp. 24-26). Said instructions and interrogatories, defendant-appellant contends, may have misled the jury
as to the elements and burden of proof sustained by the parties
to the instant action, and were so erroneous as to make it impossible for defendant-appellant to receive a fair hearing on
the issues.
In response to defendant-appellant's argument, we are
constrained of necessity to recite once again the well-established rule that the propriety and correctness of individual instructions is not to be determined by considering those instructions
in a vacuum, but by considering those challenged instructions
in connection with other instructions that have been given by
the Trial Court and considering the adequacy of the charge as
a whole. Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. Padgett, supra; Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra; Startin v. Madsen, supra; Walkenhorst v. Kesler, supra; Redd v. Airway Motor Coachlines,
supra; Brunson v. Strong, supra; Rivas v. Pacific Finance Co.,
supra. (See Point III for further elaboration of this well-established point of law.)
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In the instant case, the Trial Court provided a general instruction to the jury concerning the requirements and burden of
proof as to the elements and issues of the case and provided,
moreover, an instruction as to the meaning of the phrase "preponderance of the evidence." Those instructions are reproduced herein from the record of the proceedings in the instant
case.
Instruction Number Six provides:
INSTRUCTION

NO.

6

Whenever in these instructions it is stated that
the burden, or the burden of proof, rests upon a certain
party to prove a certain allegation made by him, the
meaning of such an instruction is this: that unless the
truth of that allegation is proved by a preponderance
of the evidence, you shall find that the same is not
true. If the evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any allegation, you must find that such
allegation has not been proved.
Instruction Number Five provides:
INSTRUCTION

NO.

5

The term "preponderance of the evidence" means
the greater weight of the evidence; that is, such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, is more
convincing as to its truth.
The above instructions clearly and fairly presented the
nature and elements of proof and the burden of proof in the
instant case. Defendant-appellant's contention that the jury
might have been misled by other instructions in considering
the elements and burden of proof is misconceived.
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Further, even assuming arguendo, that there were any
merit to defendant-appellant's contention that the challenged
instructions were erroneous, it is well established in this jurisdiction that where it is apparent from the whole testimony
that the verdict produced by the jury is correct on the merits,
any error committed by the Trial Court in the giving of instructions is to be considered harmless. Broadbent v. Denver
& Rio Grande R.R. Co., 48 Utah 598, 160 P. 1185 (1916);
Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 708 (1936);
Dailey v. Salt Lake City and U.R. Co., 61 Utah 238, 247 P.
293 (1926); Moore v. Utah and Idaho Central R. Co., 52
Utah 373, 174 P. 873 (1918).
From the record and transcript of the instant case, we
submit that the verdict and decision of the jury is obviously
correct on its merits and that the decision is substantiated and
borne out conclusively by the testimony and evidence proffered
at trial. As a result, even if there were merit to defendant-appellant's contentions (as there is not), this Court would not be
justified in reversing the obviously correct verdict entered in
the instant case.
POINT

V

THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFENDANTS C O U N T E R C L A I M FOR FRAUD
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AND THE BANK.
On motion of the plaintiffs and the intervenor, the Court
dismissed the defendant's Counterclaims for fraud at the conclusion of the evidentiary phase of the trial because no proof
of general or punitive damages was shown, but the Court permitted the issues of fraud to be submitted to the jury as an
affirmative defense (See written Order of September 21, 1971,
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R. 190). Defendant asserts in his brief (Point V) that the
ruling was erroneous because he had paid $9,000.00 on the
contract under which the stock was purchased. For several
reasons, there is no merit to defendant's contention on this
point.
Because defendant's Counterclaims were based on separate
theories of fraud, i.e., common-law fraud against the Bank and
statutory fraud against the Souvalls, the plaintiffs and intervener urged the Court to submit the issues of fact to the jury
by means of special interrogatories (R. 185-188). The jury
considered all of the interrogatories and found that neither the
Bank (Interrogatories Nos. 11 through 16) nor the plaintiffs
(Interrogatories Nos. 17 through 25) had defrauded the defendant under any theory. Therefore, the jury answered all of
the questions of fraud that could have been submitted to them
in connection with his Counterclaim against the contentions
of the defendant. In other words, the very questions that would
have been submitted to the jury in connection with the Counterclaims were fully answered on the affirmative defense. Defendant's assertions of fraud were rejected, and if the Counterclaims had remained, they would necessarily have been dismissed by the Court. The jury's answers to the interrogatories
on fraud mooted the question on appeal. Either way, the result
must be the same — judgment against the defendant and for
the plaintiffs and the Bank.
The appellant's brief states that the defendant tendered
back the equivalent of 10,000 shares of Universal Leasing
stock to the Bank (P. 27). The evidence does not support
this assertion. Defendant's agreement of purchase (Exhibit
3-P) shows that the Universal Leasing Company stock could
29
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

be freely traded when it was delivered to the plaintiff. On
page 4, paragraph 4 of the Exhibit, the Contract states that the
buyer had received an opinion issued by Attorney Alexander
Walker, Jr., giving reasons why previous restrictions on the
sale of stock should be eliminated. (The lengthy opinion itself, dated March 20, 1970, was received in evidence as Exhibit 32-P during the trial.) After that the stock could be
traded freely. Since the evidence clearly shows that Mr. Hunter
received the stock on March 25, 1970 (R. 342-4), he was free
to trade it as he pleased when it came into his possession. After
suit was filed in this action, the defendant brought to the
Bank 5,188,000 shares of Universal Rockwell stock in the
name of Don Timothy. This stock was registered, lettered stock
that could not be freely traded like the stock he had received
from the Bank (R. 737). Defendant asserts that this was a fair
return even though he argued throughout the trial that the
Universal Rockwell stock was worthless (R. 794-796). The
tender was obviously inadequate.
Hunter admitted that he had sold or otherwise disposed
of a great bulk of the 4,530,000 shares of Universal Rockwell
stock that had been exchanged for the Souvall shares of stock
(R. 783-796). The agreed consideration on these sales was
considerably more than $9,000.00, although Hunter's ability
to collect was severely lacking. In one transaction he received
a computer floor and an air-conditioner from Mark Eames in
lieu of payment of $10,000.00 (R. 791-93). In addition
Hunter received the inventory of the S & F Supply Co. as part
of the purchase contract for the stock and other assets. The
evidence further shows that he sold the inventory so obtained
and retained the funds derived therefrom. This amount was
considerably more than $9,000.00.
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CONCLUSION
The matters raised by the appellant on this appeal have
no merit and are unsupported by the record made in the Trial
Court. For this reason, the Judgment against the defendant
S. Craig Hunter should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
C. NELSON DAY
United States Attorney
H. RALPH KLEMM
Assistant United States Attorney
200 U.S. Post Office & Courthouse
350 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Intervening
Plaintiff-Respondent
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brief on Alvin I. Smith, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents, J. C. Penney Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; on
Richard H. Nebeker, Esq., Attorney for Intervening PlaintiffRespondent, 400 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; and on Walter P. Faber, Jr., Esq., and John Taft Benson, Esq., Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, 606 Newhouse
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